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I n  th is  article, the argument is p u t  tha t  "d is tor t ion thesis1' 
apologies fo r  the necessity o f  i l lusion i n  the content o f  
journalism constitutes a conceptually lethal approach both to 
mass communication, and t o  media criticism. 
Dans cet article, I1auteur soutient que la "distort ion thesis'' 
invoquke pour  just i f ier  le besoin d' i l lusion dans le contenu 
journalistique consti tue une approche conceptuellement 
sinistre, 8 la fois pour  les communications de masse e t  pour  la 
c r i t r ique  des mkdia. 
Within the body o f  mass media cr i t ic ism, it is argued w i th  growing 
frequency tha t  the media are gu i l t y  o f  a g rea t  deal o f  misbehavior, tha t  
in ways both deliberate and unwi t t ing they supply information to thei r  
publ ics i n  vary ing  shades and hues o f  un t ru th .  Often these cr i t ic isms 
are substantiated w i th  litanies o f  at roc i ty  stories; and the cr i t ica l  
charges themselves are framed in  standard terms such as 'deception,' 
'distortion,' 'bias,' 'fabrication,' ' i l lusion' and so on. There may be an 
-element o f  rhetorical overstatement to  many o f  these assessments, and 
some may feel that  the treatment o f  the media has been excessively 
harsh; b u t  the meanings o f  the terms in which these cr i t ic isms have 
been cast have general ly been unproblematic, and the messages 
coherent. There is, fo r  instance, the shared perception among 
commentators tha t  terms l ike 'distort ion' and ' fabricat ion' denote 
unwelcome states o f  af fa i rs  which nonetheless st i l l  are corr igible, a t  
least in principle. It also is general ly assumed b y  these same cr i t ics  
tha t  audiences are ent i t led to t ruthfu lness and accuracy i n  media 
portrayals, and tha t  th is  entitlement ref lects what readers and viewers 
want. 
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In the last dozen years o f  so, a more d is tu rb ing  k i nd  o f  media 
in terpretat ion has begun t o  emerge. I t s  appearance as an expl ic i t ly  
developed c r i t i que  i s  only infrequent, b u t  the fact tha t  it already has 
poked i t s  camel's nose inside the tent  means tha t  it i s  no t  too ear ly  fo r  
us  t o  pay it some mind. Essentially th is  k i n d  o f  commentary amounts to  
a rgu ing  tha t  d is tor t ion ( i l lusion, fabricat ion) i n  the realm o f  mass 
communication is commonplace, tha t  it i s  unavoidable, and tha t  being a t  
least par t ia l ly  deceived is something that  the publ ic real ly wants and 
expects. Accordingly, it i s  argued, we ought  t o  recognize and more o r  
less tolerate th is  condition as universal and necessary. Let us cal l  it 
the "d is tor t ion thesis." 
The thesis is ambivalent. It begins as a descript ion o f  ex is t ing 
states o f  af fa i rs ,  b u t  qu ick ly  takes on a normative o r  prescr ip t ive 
prof i le. It says, in effect,  tha t  th is  i s  the way people and 
organizations communicate, tha t  th is  i s  what people real ly  want, and so 
cer ta in k inds  o f  d is tor t ion aren't  real ly al l  tha t  unusual o r  intolerable. 
To  understand all, as it were, i s  to  forg ive all. 
B u t  there is more. Th is  cur ious sty le o f  apologia also is 
predicated upon a concept o f  language and communication which is 
ultimately incoherent. Moreover, it i s  a conceptually lethal approach to 
mass communication and media cr i t ic ism because it b l u r s  the d is t inct ion 
between communication and il lusion. In so doing, it undermines the 
benchmarks of t r u t h  and in te l l ig ib i l i ty  upon which communication 
cr i t ic ism ultimately must rest.  
Two clear examples o f  th is  k ind  o f  cr i t ic ism are Theodore Levit t 's 
"The Moral i ty ( ? )  of Advert ising," and  Lewis H. Lapham's "Gilding the 
News." The la t ter  piece was publ ished i n  Harper's in 1981 while 
Lapham was editor.  Levi t t 's  ar t ic le  f i r s t  appeared in the Harvard 
Business Review in 1972, b u t  has enjoyed wider subsequent circulat ion, 
and now seems t o  command something o f  the status o f  a manifesto. It 
has been included, as a representat ive piece i n  Lee Thayer's Ethic's, 
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Moral i ty and the Media, and it is l isted as a bulk-sale item i n  a 
catalogue o f  the Canadian Adver t is ing Advisory Board. 
Cosmetic Dis tor t ion as Imperative 
Levi t t ls  thesis is t ha t  "embellishment and  d is tor t ion are among 
advert ising's legitimate and socially desirable purposes11 (pp. 185-186). 
To  th is  he contrast "falsi f icat ion w i th  larcenous intent," which he 
acknowledges as being "illegitimate.1t The  rub ,  as he  goes on to 
suggest, is tha t  the d is t inct ion between the two k inds  o f  advert ising is 
"not  as simple, obvious o r  g rea t  as one might  expect.I1 Tha t  
concession, as it t u r n s  out,  has some serious ramifications when we 
take in to account the pract ical implications o f  h is  position. I n  any 
case, Levit t ls main preoccupation is w i th  defending the  non-larcenous 
species o f  adver t is ing d is tor t ion as being a per fect ly  defensible mode o f  
communication. 
The basic s t ruc tu re  o f  the  argument can be  b r ie f l y  reconstructed 
as follows: 
1. The purpose o r  in ten t  o f  rhetoric, and o f  poetry  and a r t ,  is 
I t to convince and seducet8 (p. 186).  t o  persuade, to ge t  us  t o  
feel and to perceive and t o  believe in cer ta in ways. The 
a r t i s t  is characterized as one who seeks " to convert" the 
human soul; as one "who meddles w i th  man% soul" (p. 189).  
2. A r t  and  poetry  do no t  represent th ings and events as they 
truly are. Instead, they  exaggerate, d is to r t  and falsi fy. 
Keatls "Ode t o  a Grecian Urn," notwithstanding i t s  poetic 
merits, becomes an "exaggerated, d is tor ted and palpably false 
d e ~ c r i p t i o n ~ ~  (p. 186).  The domain o f  human production and 
expression i s  inherent ly  deceptive, because a l l  peoples and 
societies th rough al l  times a re  occupied w i th  " the purposeful 
transmutat ion o f  nature 's  primeval state.. .Everybody 
everywhere wants t o  modify, transform, embellish, enr ich and 
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reconstruct  the world around him--to introduce in to an 
otherwise harsh o r  bland existence some so r t  o f  purposeful and 
d is to r t ing  alleviation" (p .  188).  
3. Adver t is ing is involved w i th  the same k i nd  o f  d is tor t ion and 
seduction tha t  we f ind  i n  a r t  and poetry .  "Both a r t  and 
adver t is ing are rhetorical,  and both l i tera l ly  false1' (p.  190) .  
Commerce "takes essentially the same l ibert ies w i th  real i ty  and 
l i tera l i ty  as the ar t is t ,  except tha t  commerce calls i t s  creations 
advert ising, o r  industr ia l  design o r  packaging. As wi th a r t ,  
the purpose is t o  inf luence the audience b y  creating il lusions, 
symbols, and implications tha t  promise more than pu re  
funct ional i ty" (p.  186) .  
4. There is noth ing real ly remarkable o r  unsuitable about th is  
widespread, commercially induced environment o f  i l lusion 
because it is rooted i n  the human being's need fo r  
embellishment and cosmetic distort ion. Nature i n  the raw is 
unendurable; and T.S. Eliot is approvingly  quoted as having 
observed tha t  "human k i n d  cannot bear v e r y  much reality." 
The blandishments o f  packagers and advert isers are 
represented as pal l iat ives which contr ibute t o  our  surv iva l :  
"Without distort ion, embellishment, and elaboration, l i fe  would 
be  drab,  dul l ,  anguished, and a t  i t s  existent ial  worst" (p. 
192).  If rel igion uses archi tecture and music t o  a t t rac t  and 
hold i t s  audience, the argument continues, and if sex is 
enhanced th rough perfumes and powders, then "it is 
r idiculous to deny the legitimacy o f  more modest, and similar, 
embellishments to the world o f  commerce" (p. 193) .  
5. A l l  communication, al l  symbolic expression entails distort ion; 
and so it is unremarkable tha t  the advert isers1 copy and 
images should t u r n  ou t  t o  be  d is tor ted and  skewed. How 
could they no t  be  since they are only  symbolic constructs? 
6 .  A t  stake, then, is no t  the prevention o f  distort ion. Tha t  
would be impossible t o  avoid. Rather, "it is i n  the end, to  
know what k inds o f  distort ions we actual ly want so tha t  each 
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o f  our  l ives is.. .made bearable" (p. 195).  To  th is  end, Lev i t t  
concludes h is  ar t ic le  w i th  a l i s t  o f  suggestions enabling 
businessmen t o  steer "a middle wayu between acceptable and 
unacceptable modes o f  distort ion. 
Lev i t t  is equivocal about the status o f  adver t is ing distort ion. For 
the most par t ,  non-larcenous adver t is ing,  while it is also called 
'distort ion' and lillusion,' is more of ten characterized in euphemistic 
terms : "embellishment ," "blandishments," "enhancement ,I1 
"exaggeration," "elaboration," l'allurements,ll l'promotion," and so fo r th .  
It would seen, then, tha t  p a r t  o f  h is  defense is t o  represent d is tor t ion 
i n  a weaker sense--distortion, tha t  is, which promotes dreams and  
make-believe b u t  which, on a spectrum o f  deceit, s t i l l  fal ls shor t  o f  
ou t r igh t  fa ls i ty  wi th in tent  t o  deceive. In one place, too, he  speaks, 
o f  "the so-called d is tor t ions o f  advert ising, p roduc t  design and 
packingu (p. 192) .  While th is  has the effect o f  making adver t is ing 
d is tor t ion appear t o  be problematic, it can jus t  as easily be  taken t o  
stand as a paraphrase o f  d is tor t ion in the weaker sense. And  yet,  the 
use o f  terms l i ke  'distort ion1 and 'i l lusion1 seems t o  suggest tha t  
something more i s  a t  stake than jus t  an innocent fuzziness o r  a minor 
absence o f  focus. A f te r  all, they belong t o  that  family o f  negatively 
epistemic terms l ike ' falsi ty ,I 'misleading1 and 'un t ru th fu l '  which connote 
states o r  situations which stand in opposition to the t ru th .  What then 
are we to make o f  th is  d is tor t ion o r  enhancement which bears a s t rong 
semantic a f f in i t y  w i th  falsi ty, y e t  which is s t i l l  somehow socially 
desirable? 
Given Levit t ls collection o f  easily digest ible synonyms, it is 
tempting to believe tha t  h is  thesis is innocuous, tha t  he  real ly is 
ta lk ing about the harmless pract ice o f  presenting products in the i r  best 
l ight;  and tha t  the d is tor t ion which he  countenances is a so r t  o f  
misnomer, no worse than a peccadillo. An  in terpretat ion as benign as 
th is  does l i t t l e  t o  resolve our  uncer ta inty ,  however. A t  best, it would 
only  reduce h is  commentary to  the t r i v ia l  and  unexci t ing claim that  it is 
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legitimate f o r  advert isers to  present the i r  product  i n  a posit ive and 
at t ract ive l ight .  This, to  be  sure, i s  a point  tha t  no one would 
seriously contest, b u t  it i s  also one which a t  the same time would make 
Levit t 's exercise appear to  be  as needless as it would be 
uncontroversial. 
More d is turb ingly ,  there are statements made b y  Levi t t  which show 
that  th is  supposedly weaker rendi t ion o f  d is tor t ion is p a r t  o f  a larger 
and more serious picture. He admits tha t  "it i s  d i f f icu l t ,  as a pract ical 
matter, t o  draw a l ine between legitimate d is tor t ion and essential 
falsehood. ..the dist inct ion is no t  as simple, obvious, o r  as g rea t  as one 
might  think1' (p. 186). Given th is  confession, the following question 
poses i tself :  If adver t isers and media pract i t ioners adopt policies and 
procedures based upon an acceptance of some forms o f  distort ion, then, 
b y  v i r t ue  o f  unclear boundaries and equally indeterminate perceptions, 
what i s  t o  prevent  the application o f  these same practices when the 
d is tor t ion is no  longer innocent, y e t  s t i l l  indist inguishable? A 
dist inct ion, tha t  is, which is d i f f i cu l t  to  detect and which doesn't seem 
to  be  much o f  a dist inct ion, wi l l  cer ta in ly  be no less d i f f i cu l t  to  respect 
i n  the complexity o f  the market place. 
The  benign o r  harmless in terpretat ion o f  Levit t 's thesis is unl ike ly  
fo r  another reason: The defence o f  d is tor t ion associated w i th  
adver t is ing (and w i th  the a r ts )  i s  semantically embedded wi th in a much 
wider claim. Not only  does he  single ou t  the falsification o f  a r t  and 
poetry ,  b u t  he  states as well tha t  d is tor t ion is endemic to the ent i re  
realm o f  symbolism: "Communication can never  be  the real th ing  it 
ta lks about. Therefore al l  communication i s  in some inevitable fashion a 
depar ture from reality1' (p. 187). Th is  statement is the fu lcrum on  
which Levit t 's argument rests, and the  enormity o f  i t s  thesis i s  
evident. A universal ('all ') inference ( ' therefore')  i s  being made t o  the  
ef fect  tha t  in the domain o f  human communication a si tuat ion o f  u n t r u t h  
o f  d is tor t ion ( 'departure')  is unavoidable (' inevitable'). 
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Bu t  why does th is  have t o  be  so? No reason o r  evidence is 
adduced fo r  this, other than the dist inct ion i tse l f  between 
U1communicationn and "the real thing;" b u t  what begins as a commonplace 
d is t inct ion between word and th ing  v e r y  qu ick ly  transforms i tse l f  in to 
an unbridgeable epistemological rift. A t  f i r s t  glance, "departureM might 
seem to  lack the muscle o f  the other three words, b u t  it funct ions ve r y  
effect ively even as a sor t  o f  weasel word: it picks u p  on the 
non-identi ty ("can never beUU) between communication and real i ty,  b u t  
then, without fu r ther  developments o r  reasoning, converts tha t  
non-identi ty in to a slippage o r  ret reat  from some implied ideal 
o f  ... what? Presumably an absolutely t r u t h fu l ,  accurate mir ror ing o f  
real i ty  which ex hypothesi is impossible because the communicative 
process simply does no t  coincide w i th  i t s  object. Yet even if the stones 
themselves could speak o r  symbolize, why should we le t  ourselves t h i nk  
tha t  the i r  self-depictions would be any closer to  the t r u t h  than those 
prov ided b y  human communication? 
T r u t h  as Unattainable 
V i r tua l l y  the same k inds o f  claims made b y  Lev i t t  wi th  respect t o  
adver t is ing were repeated and applied t o  journalism b y  Lewis Lapham 
when he undertook to wr i te  about the news media's condemnation o f  
Janet Cooke o f  the Washington Post. Cooke, it wi l l  be  remembered, had 
wr i t ten  a Pulitzer Prize article, "Jimmy's World," about an 
eight-year-old heroin addict. Later it was discovered tha t  the ar t ic le  
was a fabrication. Cooke was no t  alone. Shor t ly  af ter  her  exposure, 
columnist Michael Daly o f  the New York Daily News was disgraced when 
it was learned tha t  h is  copy f i led from Belfast was fraudulent.  
I n  many ways, editor Lapham's analysis o f  the news media's 
condemnation o f  Janet Cooke (and o f  others) is as d is turb ing as the 
mischief committed b y  Cooke herself .  His point  seems t o  be that  
denunciations o f  Cooke are forced, and somehow inappropriate, since 
journal ists general ly t ra f f i c  i n  fabrications and a l l  sor ts  o f  a r t fu l  
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deception. Cooke, he argues, was made to  b e  a scapegoat because her  
invent ion threatened t o  unmask the  random mix o f  fact  and  f ic t ion which 
character izes news services. Lapham does n o t  exonerate Cooke, b u t  
what is disconcert ing is tha t  Cooke is made t o  appear unexceptional, 
and t h a t  i n  i t se l f  i s  a k i n d  o f  exculpat ion. With a su rp r i s ing  degree o f  
cynicism, Lapham expresses surp r i se  a t  the  denunciations since, as he 
would have u s  believe, we real ly  cannot expect much bet ter  from a 
press which merely panders t o  the audience's desire t o  b e  deceived, to  
be fed a d ie t  o f  myths and  il lusions: 
If the  media succeed w i th  the i r  spectacles and g rand  
simplif ications, it is because the i r  audiences def ine happiness 
as the state o f  be ing well and  a r t f u l l y  deceived. People l ike 
to  l isten t o  stories, to  believe what they ' re  told, to  imagine 
t h a t  the implacable forces o f  h i s to ry  speak to  them w i th  a 
human voice. Who can bear t o  l ive wi thout  myths..  .? The 
media thus  play the  p a r t  o f  the cour t ier ,  reassur ing the i r  
patrons tha t  the  wor ld  conforms to  the wish 'of the pres id ing 
majority.. .By  te l l ing people what they  assume they already 
know, the media ref lect  what society wants to  t h i n k  t o  i tself .  
The  images in the  m i r r o r  compose the  advertisement fo r  
rea l i t y  (p .  37). 
Given th is  un f la t te r ing  por t raya l  o f  the  publ ic 's  desire, it is no t  
su rp r i s ing ,  perhaps, t h a t  the media should emerge as pimps and 
suppl iers. Even the  paean i n  the  f ina l  l ines o f  h is  ar t ic le  t o  
"compassion. honesty and moral intell igence" seems half-hearted and  
unconvincing. B y  th is  po in t  the  reader already has been led t o  believe 
t h a t  these qual i t ies are v i r t u a l l y  non-existent i n  today's journalism. 
Another major premise i n  Lapham's commentary is the o ld  chestnut  
that  'truth is relative,' and  tha t  the  process o f  theor iz ing and selection 
ipso facto renders any descr ip t ion skewed o r  f ict i t ious. The media 
supply  us  w i th  l i t t l e  more than contr ived myths and  fables: 
... maybe people need t o  be reminded tha t  the  media te l l  
stories. There  is 'nothing reprehensible about te l l ing stories. 
Some are  more complicated than  others. Gibbon to ld  a s tory ,  
and  so d i d  Einstein. Almost every th ing  presented i n  the 
theatre o f  the  news const i tutes a k i n d  o f  s to ry ,  and  to some 
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extent  a l l  the pr inc ipa l  players..  .appear as composite f igures. 
the i r  quotations f i t ted  in to a context  suitable to  the occasion, 
the i r  images made u p  o f  fragments as easily transposed as the 
b i t s  and  pieces o f  a mosaic o r  a documentary fi lm (p.  32). 
We are a l l  engaged in the same enterprise, al l  o f  us  caught  
u p  on the making o f  analogies and  metaphors.. .Stories move 
from t r u t h s  to  facts, n o t  the  other  way around, and  tel lers o f  
tales endeavor to  convey the  essence o f  a th ing.  ..Journalists 
have less i n  common w i th  diplomats and  soothsayers than they 
do w i th  vagabond poets (p.  33). 
Consistent ly,  b u t  sadly, Lapham includes himself among the class o f  
fabricators both i n  h is  past  practices, and  even while wr i t i ng  about 
Cooke: Ill f i n d  myself  doing the same th ing  i n  the  wr i t i ng  o f  th is  
essay ... On a t  least one level o f  meaning, I have only  a formal o r  
theoretical g rasp  o f  what I'm ta lk ing  about; Miss Cooke and Mr.  Daly 
appear to  me as characters in a p lay o f  ideas1' (pp.  34-35). 
Lapham, it is t rue,  does n o t  say (as Lev i t t  does) tha t  al l  
communication is d is tor ted and  biased; and  so to  tha t  extent  h is  thesis 
appears to  b e  more rest r ic ted.  B u t  b y  s t ress ing the re la t i v i t y  o f  t r u t h  
i n  wr i t i ng ,  b y  repeatedly emphasizing the  random dif ference between 
fact  and f ic t ion i n  the  media as well as the  media's wholesale commitment 
to  fabricat ion and  theatre, he does every  b i t  as much as Lev i t t  t o  
reduce the sphere o f  journalism t o  f ic t ion and  il lusion. It may seem 
disarmingly honest when he includes himself among the  class o f  
fabricators. B u t  even so, w h y  should we believe h is  words any more 
than t h e  f ict ions o f  others.. .such as those o f  Cooke o r  Daly? 
There is an enormous i r o n y  here. Lapham purpor ts  to  prov ide us  
w i th  a descript ion o f  the  real state o f  a f fa i rs  i n  the media, b u t  there in 
l ies a paradox. Given the  f i c t i ve  na tu re  o f  the  journal ist ic enterprise, 
as well as Lapham1s own s o r r y  inclusion wi th in  it, how can he fa i l  to  
realize tha t  the t ru th-va lue o f  h is  own message is programmed to  
self-destruct i n  much less than f i ve  minutes? 
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Even if h is  own message were no t  in t r ins ica l ly  self-disqual i fying, 
too many important dist inct ions have been ignored o r  minimized. There 
is, and ought  to  be, a dif ference between te l l ing stories in  novels and 
sof t  h is to ry  on the one hand, and news reportage on the other. 
Journal ists presumably are h i red  t o  prov ide t r u t h f u l  descript ions and 
sober commentary; readers expect non-fiction, and they have no t  been 
warned tha t  f igures and events prot rayed there in are collages. It is 
reprehensible to  tel l  stories under  these conditions. While Laphamts 
analysis admittedly does no t  gainsay the d is t inct ion between t r u t h  and 
f ic t ion as an ideal and a t  the conceptual level, the ef fect  o f  h is  
commentary and i t s  unguarded generalizations i s  t o  render  it chimerical 
i n  the real world. Similarly, it is obfuscation o f  the worst k i nd  to 
reduce the work o f  Gibbon and Einstein t o  the level o f  'story-tel l ing'  
w i th  al l  the  f ic t ive and i l lusory connotations tha t  word contains. Then 
t o  compound the confusion b y  suggesting tha t  journal ist ic hoaxes belong 
essentially t o  the same class makes matters even worse. 
What Lapham neglects is to  supply u s  w i th  qual i f iers (s t ronger  
than "almost" and " to some extentt ' )  that  might  have lent a l i t t l e  more 
balance and precision to h i s  commentary. He might have said tha t  some 
of the media deal i n  inventions, tha t  they sometimes fabricate. Even if 
he had settled for  complaining tha t  most o f  the media d is tor t ,  o r  tha t  
they d i s t o r t  most o f  the  time, there s t i l l  would have been enough o f  a 
dist inct ion preserved between 'most1 and  the force o f  'all '  to  save h is  
message from s ink ing in to incoherence. It is on ly  because some news 
wr i te rs  and  broadcasters do the job r i g h t  tha t  we can i n  pract ice te l l  
the good from the bad; the t r ue  from the false. Quite r i gh t l y ,  Lapham 
counsels the modern reader against placing h i s  fa i th  i n  the "contr ived 
mythologies o f  the media;" b u t  he  might  also have added tha t  a 
sensitive regard fo r  truth and accuracy as of ten as no t  is operat ive in 
journal ist ic decisions. Were th is  no t  so, it would be ha rd  t o  know what 
to  make o f  h is  concluding remarks about each individual having t o  
discover the t r u t h  fo r  himself each day b y  "work ing w i th  the tools o f  
h is  own though, imagination, and patient s tudy"  (p. 39). I n  Laphamts 
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 1986 Vol. 12 No. 2 61 
universe o f  systematized media d is tor t ion and fiction, it is ha rd  t o  know 
what t o  make o f  th is  individual 's endeavor since, in today's world, such 
efforts would no t  take us  ve r y  fa r  wi thout  considerable reliance upon 
the self-same media which he so cynical ly denigrates. 
The d is tor t ion thesis crops u p  elsewhere. I n  h is  widely quoted 
analysis o f  news production, Deciding What's News, Herber t  Gans 
cinches more t i gh t l y  ye t  the point  made b y  Lapham and Levit t .  Gans 
claims tha t  undis tor ted news i s  impossible t o  a r r i ve  at; and once again 
th is  is because o f  something inherent  in the process o f  communication 
i tse l f :  
Even if a per fect  and complete reproduction (o r  construct ion) 
o f  external real i ty  were philosophically o r  logistically feasible, 
the mere act o f  reproduction would consti tute a d is tor t ion of  
tha t  real i ty.  Thus object ive o r  absolute nondistort ion i s  
impossible (p.  305). 
Once again, to  describe is t o  d is tor t .  B u t  on the same page, Gans 
adds a new tw is t  when h e  says tha t  " the concept o f  d is tor t ion is 
nevertheless val id, b u t  on ly  as a relational one.'' Tha t  is,  the  
journal ist 's repor t  is unavoidably and necessarily distorted, b u t  it can 
be  assessed as d is tor ted o r  biased on ly  in relat ion t o  a specific 
standard o r  ideal o f  non-distortion. Yet these standards o r  ideals 
themselves, in tu rn ,  never  can be  absolute o r  objective because they, 
in turn, res t  upon a number o f  subject ive real i ty  and  value judgments; 
and  that,  of course, means tha t  bias o r  d is tor t ion i s  ultimately 
unavoidable. While these relational standards o r  ideals never  can be 
absolute, Gans makes the point  tha t  they can become universal th rough 
agreement; and in th is  way, he  b r i ngs  ou t  the  pol i t ical dimension 
involved i n  choosing journal ist ic values and ideals. However, the 
unremovable warp between word  and  object remains v e r y  much in place 
in Gansl account. 
Though they might  appear extreme, the  arguments propounded b y  
Lev i t t  and  Lapham are no t  real ly  al l  tha t  anomalous. In po in t  o f  fact 
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they have only made expl ic i t  what many others assume or' believe, and 
they have art iculated what many media pract i t ioners and social scientists 
have only  h inted a t  o r  suggested. The i r  message also has a wider 
histor ical significance, because it echoes i n  modern idiom, and w i th  
special application to mass media, the o ld philosophical lament that  
human communication always falsifies real i ty;  tha t  our  symbolic 
renderings are reconstruct ions which necessarily belie the s t ruc tu re  o f  
th ings and events i n  the real world. It is a complaint a t  least as old 
as the Presocratics. For Heraclitus and h is  commentators ( K i r k  and 
Raven, 1962, pp.  196-198), an expression such as " the same r i ve r "  
belies the relentless f l u x  o f  f lowing waters. According to Parmenides 
( K i r k  and Raven, pp. 269-277). discourse w i th  i t s  assortment o f  plurals 
and negatives and ta lk  about change leads us  in to confusion and 
perp lex i ty ,  and away from ins ight  in to the radical un ic i t y  of  being. I n  
the ear ly  modern era, John Locke (ed. Nidditch, 1975) remarked upon 
the obscuring power o f  language: 
. . .words.. .interpose themselves so much between our  
Understanding, and the T r u t h ,  which it would contemplate 
and apprehend, tha t  l ike the Medium th rough which visible 
Objects pass, the i r  Obscur i ty  and Disorder does [s i c ]  no t  
seldom cast a mist before our  Eyes, and impose upon our  
Understandings (p .  488). 
More recently, philosophers as disparate as Ber t rand  Russell (see 
Clack, 1969, p. 17) and Henr i  Bergson (1946, 1955) have argued tha t  
natura l  language o r  scient i f ic abstract ions ( i n  the case o f  Bergson) 
stand i n  the way of our  t r u l y  understanding reality.' I n  A f te r  Babel, 
George Steiner argues eloquently tha t  the essence o f  language lies not  
i n  i t s  power ' to  prov ide t r ue  and accurate descriptions, b u t  in i t s  power 
to  disguise, t o  negate, to  falsi fy. (Therein, he  insists, lies our  source 
o f  freedom and the protect ion o f  our  sanity.) 
. . .the use o f  language fo r  a l tern i ty ,  f o r  mis-construction, fo r  
i l lusion and p!ay, are the greatest o f  man's tools b y  
far  ... Thus it IS inaccurate and theoret ical ly spurious t o  
schematize language as ' informationt o r  to  ident i fy  language, 
be it unspoken o r  vocalized, w i th  tcommunication.l The  la t ter  
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term wil l  serve only if it includes, if it places emphasis on, 
what i s  no t  said in the saying, what is said only par t ia l ly ,  
a l l u s i v e l y ~ o r  w i th  in ten t  t o  screen. Human speech conceals 
f a r  more than it confides; it b l u r s  much more than it defines; 
it distances more than it connects (pp. 224, 229). 
Knowledge and Language-Mediation 
A t  f i r s t  glance, then, it might  seem tha t  Lev i t t  and Lapham, (and 
Cans), should have a lot going fo r  them w i th  th is  k i nd  o f  philosophical 
support.  F i r s t  impressions, however, o f ten are misleading. There are 
competing and saner philosophical considerations which do more to show 
tha t  the d is tor t ion thesis is a confused and badly  motivated one. 
The f i r s t  o f  these has to do w i th  our  recognizing tha t  to  know a 
language is already t o  know a good deal about our  natura l  and social 
environment, and  tha t  without the mediation o f  language we would 
understand v e r y  l i t t l e  o f  what we perceptual ly encounter.2 The  
connection between our  understanding and real i ty  is anchored in the 
same learning experiences in which we acqui re a language and i t s  wide 
assortment o f  sk i l ls  and techniques, i n  tha t  complex melange o f  
behavior, practices and conventions ou t  o f  which our  words take on 
uses and meaning.3 Knowledge o f  a language, then, is already 
f re ighted w i th  rules and agreements which g ive  sense to our  speech 
acts, and focus to our  understanding (Searle, 1969, ch. 3; 1971). The 
journal ist ideals and standards t o  which Gans appeals f o r  a merely 
relational va l id i t y  are not  unimportant,  b u t  the i r  value presupposes the 
proto-rules and proto-convenants embedded wi th in natural language 
i tse l f  b y  v i r t ue  o f  which we touch base w i th  real i ty  and wi th our  social 
environment. In fa l l ib i l i ty ,  o f  course, is no t  the  issue here. On the 
contrary,  the grammar o f  language, as Wittgenstein (1963, #109, #122) 
warns us, is not  perspicuous: words mislead us, and our  intell igence 
i s  easily bewitched b y  them. B u t  it is s t i l l  these self-same resources o f  
language, and i t s  l inkages wi th our  environment, which enable us t o  
recover c la r i t y  and focus i n  the th ings we say and wri te. Proponents 
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o f  the d is tor t ion thesis overlook these deep-structured and 
self-corrective assets. Too precipitously they move from an awareness 
o f  some falsehood to the fallacious assertion tha t  communication is 
distorted. 
Second, consider Levi t t 's  claim tha t  because communication i s  other 
than the real th ing,  then it i s  necessarily discrepant--(i.e., a 
"depar ture from")--with respect t o  tha t  same real i ty .  The inference 
t u rns  ou t  t o  be a puzzl ing one, because no f u r t he r  indication is g iven 
o f  what goes wrong between word and object. We are simply u rged  to 
believe that  when it comes to communicating, communicators are in a 
'no-win1 si tuat ion because o f  some k i nd  o f  gap o r  shield between what i s  
and the human utterance. I t  would probably be  too fantastical and too 
un fa i r  t o  assume from th is  tha t  Levi t t ,  in t r ue  Kantian style, has in 
mind some sor t  o f  hidden transcendental real i ty  masked b y  human 
words, o r  tha t  he  himself commands a wordless understanding o f  what 
lies behind the scenes. B u t  it i s  no t  a t  al l  unreasonable t o  point  ou t  
tha t  if he is going to ta lk  about o r  even mention a pre-symbolic, 
infra- l inguist ic realm o f  real i ty,  he  can do so only  in a way which is 
s t i l l  language-mediated, o r  in a way which wi l l  entai l  some remarkably 
pr iv i leged knowledge claims: 
That  th is  i s  so can be  seen, from another angle, b y  
considering how a c r i t i c  o f  language claims to know tha t  there 
i s  a "gap" o r  a "barr ier"  between language and real i ty.  He 
must, it seems, know a good deal about real i ty  i n  order  t o  
know, as he claims, tha t  language does no t  and cannot fit it 
properly. B u t  then, if he  speaks a t  all, he refutes himself 
from h is  own mouth.. .The fact is tha t  the sceptic, l ike all 
humans, cannot long remain silent, and in speaking he 
i l lustrates tha t  we can know enough about real i ty  fo r  our  
purposes (Black, p. 152). 
Our  objection can be  rephrased from a s l ight ly  d i f fe ren t  angle. The 
d is tor t ion thesis i s  universal i n  scope, and so it i s  natura l  t o  wonder 
where one could possibly stand--(in Heaven, perhaps?)--and what k i n d  
o f  footing one could ever hope t o  secure if one fe l t  compelled t o  rebel 
against and t o  move outside our  language-mediating, language-distorting 
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situation. B u t  here it can supply no direct ion. The d is tor t ion thesis, 
b y  v i r t ue  o f  i t s  unqual i f ied por t rayal  o f  communication, t u rns  ou t  to  be 
as uninformative as it is uninterest ing: 
... the under ly ing image o f  the "barr ier"  between language 
and real i ty  is a symptom o f  conceptual confusion.. .It may be 
paradoxical, b u t  it is t r ue  tha t  a "barr ier t '  tha t  it is logically 
impossible t o  remove is not, i n  any interest ing sense, a 
bar r ie r  a t  all (Black, p.  1 5 2 ) .  
Levi t t 's  epistemology, then, is such tha t  we can never hope t o  
communicate a t r u t h fu l  and unclouded p ic tu re  o f  real i ty  i n  our  
descriptions. The implied conception o f  t r u t h  a t  work i n  Lapham's 
account amounts to  much the same th ing.  Lapham seems t o  th ink  tha t  
because the journalistic enterprise entails selection and abstraction, 
( t r ue  o f  any communication), then t o  tha t  degree it merges in to that  
which is mythical, fabricated and i l lusory.  A t  th is  point, h is  theory o f  
t r u t h  becomes indist inguishable from tha t  o f  Lev i t t  fo r  whom all 
communication is a depar ture from real i ty .  Bu t  as a general theory o f  
t r u t h  and il lusion, there i s  something exaggerated and unreal ist ic about 
this. 
A l l  descript ions are par t ia l  o r  incomplete since any one o f  them can 
be amplified indefini tely, and because selection i s  physical ly 
unavoidable. Bu t  that  does no t  thereby render them false. Rather 
incompleteness, together w i th  such features as perspective o r  angle, 
are b y  themselves nothing more than the ineliminable constraints under  
which any descript ion i s  framed. The measure o f  a description's 
t ru thfu lness,  on the other hand, comes w i th  the degree t o  which it 
conforms t o  real i ty  and also w i th  the degree t o  which it harmonizes w i th  
other  credible reports; and also in many cases wi th the degree to which 
it conforms t o  methods and standards worked out  through agreements 
among professionals. To acknowledge th is  is t o  recognize that  some 
repor ts  wi l l  be  t rue,  some false, some closer t o  the t r u t h  than others; 
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b u t  it does no t  permit us to conclude that  a l l  descript ions o r  a l l  
communications belie and d is tor t .  
Th i rd ,  there i s  equivocation i n  the d is tor t ion thesis. This  i s  
inevitable because o f  grammatical misuse. The grammar o f  a term, as 
Wittgenstein (1 963, $5-9, #30-35) points out.  includes a recognitjon o f  
the ways i n  which tha t  term o r  expression is used wi th in a language, 
and  tha t  is something which is contextual o r  relational. The grammar 
o f  an expression, for one th ing,  means tha t  we also must know a good 
deal about the other words i n  a language t o  which it is related. Now, 
the grammar o f  words l ike 'distort ion' and 'deception' and 'i l lusion1 i s  
such that  they work wi th in our  language t o  characterize a certain k i nd  
o f  defect i n  ind iv idual  descript ions and  stretches o f  discourse. It is 
also p a r t  o f  the grammar o f  th is  family o f  d is tor t ion terms tha t  there 
must be  a t  least some instances o r  forms o f  communication which are no t  
d is tor ted o r  ou t  o f  focus i n  order  to  serve as a c r i te r ion  o f  d is tor t ion 
i tself .  Were th is  not  so, we would have no way o f  recognizing the 
defect ive descriptions. Jus t  as the  concept o f  a l ie logically implies the 
inst i tu t ion o f  te l l ing the truth, tha t  o f  d is tor t ion and falsification 
implies as a minimum the possibi l i ty of undis tor ted discourse. 
Accordingly, when the d is tor t ion thesis is made to be  the procrustean 
bed in to which al l  communication o r  all the media are forced to fit, the 
grammar o f  d is tor t ion breaks down under the st ra in,  and we move in to 
a zone o f  meaningless o r  incoherent discourse. Appl ied t o  the whole 
system o f  language and communication, the term 'distort ion' can gain no 
foothold because i t s  necessary correlates, ( t r u t h ,  accuracy, focus, 
non-distort ion), upon which it i s  semantically dependent, have been 
eliminated b y  the defini t ional constraints o f  the thesis i tself .  
Wittgenstein p u t  it best when he  said tha t  "a doubt  that  doubted 
every th ing  would not  be  a doubt1' (1969, #450). 
Finally, t o  grasp the full suicidal import o f  the d is tor t ion thesis as 
a mode of, o r  as a basis for ,  media cr i t ic ism, it may be  ins t ruc t i ve  t o  
compare it w i th  the method o f  universal doubt  pract iced b y  Ren6 
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Descartes. Both i n  the  Discourse on Method and i n  the  Meditations, 
Descartes reasoned tha t  because he had sometimes been misled b y  h is  
perceiv ing and judging powers, he would never  again allow himself t o  
believe any th ing  to  be t r u e  u n t i l  he could discover a proposit ion tha t  
was i t se l f  incontestably t rue.  Th is  procedure o f  d i s t rus t ,  then, was 
universa l  i n  scope, b u t  a t  the  same time provisional:  he would doubt  
on ly  i n  order  to  a r r i v e  eventual ly a t  tha t  which was clear and  d is t inct .  
A t  the same time th is  systematic d i s t r u s t  was also reinforced b y  two 
other  powerful  suppositions: (1) tha t  what was on ly  probable would be 
g iven a value no  greater  than tha t  which was downr ight  false; (2) and 
tha t  there existed a powerfu l  ev i l  s p i r i t  which cont inuously worked to  
deceive Descartes a t  every  moment o f  h i s  conscious l i fe.  Given these 
superadded conditions, it is h a r d  to  believe tha t  anyone could distance 
himself fa r the r  from a knowledge o f  the t r u t h .  Yet some o f  our  modern 
c r i t i cs  have done just  that.  
Lev i t t ,  Lapham and Gans propound a universa l  thesis which sounds 
v e r y  much ak in  to  tha t  o f  Descartes, the thesis tha t  we are confronted 
w i th  wholesale d is tor t ion and  i l lusion i n  the  realm o f  symbolic act iv i ty .  
I n  the i r  case, the reinforcement which assures a universa l  state o f  skew 
and  bias is noth ing less than a deep-seated pathological disorder w i th in  
human communication i tse l f :  the  inabi l i ty  t o  describe o r  repor t  wi thout  
fabricat ion and distort ion. B u t  the  d is tor t ion thesis t u r n s  ou t  t o  be 
much more lethal than Cartesian doub t  because inext r icabi l i ty  is now 
made t o  be absolute. For one th ing ,  the  Cartesian pol icy o f  suspending 
bel ief is on ly  a methodology; i t s  role is intended t o  b e  noth ing more 
than provisional. B u t  Lev i t t  and  Lapham p u r p o r t  to  be describing a 
real and  universa l  state o f  a f fa i rs ,  one which Gans says cannot be 
otherwise. 
Second, Descartes never  doubted the capacity o f  natura l  language 
to  express h is  thoughts and  t o  def ine realit ies (see Kenny, p. 2 1 ) .  
B u t  the  new cri t ic ism does. and th is  is w h y  it is no t  on ly  an incoherent 
thesis, b u t  a seditious one as well. It is incoherent, we have seen, 
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because it pretends to describe a universal state o f  af fa i rs  i n  terms and 
symbols and  w i th  communicative actions which are said i n  the same 
breath t o  be  incapable o f  doing so. It is ha rd  t o  see how a d is tor ted 
descript ion o f  a universal state o f  d is tor ted communication can real ly 
ge t  u s  anywhere. It is seditious because it undermines the author i ty  
and  power o f  language t o  ins t ruc t  and t o  inform. A for t ior i ,  it 
depr ives media cr i t ic ism o f  the power and means to prov ide intel l igible 
commentary wi th in the domain o f  communication and journalism. To the 
unwary,  it seems t o  be saying only  that  when we communicate we do so 
unavoidably w i th  bias, and wi th a signif icant degree o f  fabrication; b u t  
b y  v i r t ue  o f  i t s  incautious generalizations, it ends u p  saying and 
disallowing a g rea t  deal more. 
Concluding Postscript 
The scient ist o r  the mathematician o r  the philosopher can hard ly  hope 
to f lour ish if he  chooses to nu l l i f y  the power o f  reason to combine 
premises and draw inferences. So too, if the media c r i t i c  i s  to  do h is  
work, then  the one th ing  he  may no t  impugn i s  language and 
communicative competence. Our performance in the domain o f  symbolic 
action may be  imperfect, b u t  tha t  does no t  gainsay the abi l i ty  o f  the 
communicator t o  communicate, nor  the off ice o f  the  media c r i t i c  t o  point  
ou t  when and how something has gone askew. 
Notes 
1.  Bergson's unhappiness w i th  language is impl ici t  in those passages 
where he  of fers a c r i t i que  o f  the concept and  the synthetic forms 
o f  science. 
2. In a v e r y  d i f fe ren t  context,  J.L. Aust in  (1964, p. 46)  says 
something ak in  to  th is :  
... our  common stock o f  words embodies al l  the 
dist inct ions men have found wor th  drawing, and the 
connections they have found wor th  making, in the 
lifetime o f  many generations: these sure ly  are l ike ly  t o  
be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood 
u p  t o  the  long test o f  surv iva l  o f  the fittest.. . (1964, p. 
46) .  
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, 1986 Vol. 12 No. 2 69 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue convincingly that  understanding 
is grounded i n  a network o f  metaphors which characterize 
language and communication; and tha t  metaphors der ive from our  
experience o f  physical objects. 
3. Wittgenstein grounds the acquisition of l inguist ic competence i n  
behavior, and in the practices and conventions o f  a cu l tu re  (see, 
fo r  example, 1963, #23, #206, #208). 
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